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Abstract: This paper assesses the sustainability of global imbalances by testing for the 
presence of unit roots in the current account positions (measured in relation to GDP) of 
the United States, China, Japan, Germany and the oil-exporting countries using a 
methodology that allows for structural breaks in levels and trends. We find that the 
external positions of these major countries/regions are stationary around structural 
breaks, which define episodes of current account reversals. On the basis of an event 
analysis of past reversals, it appears that structural breaks are associated with shifts in 
the fiscal stance, exchange rate parities and potential output growth, a finding that 
underscores the scope for macroeconomic and structural policies to ensure the 
sustainability of external positions while avoiding potentially disruptive reversals. These 
findings have implications for long-term capital flows after the crisis. 
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1 Introduction 
Global imbalances, measured as the sum in absolute terms of the 
current account balances of major countries/regions, nearly halved in the 
aftermath of the global crisis after reaching a post war high of over 5% of 
world GDP in 2008. The United States deficit accounted for about two-
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thirds of the combined balance of deficit countries prior to the crisis and 
was matched almost entirely by the current account surpluses of Japan, 
China, Germany and the oil exporting countries. Global imbalances are 
now widening again on the back of the ongoing recovery of the world 
economy, although China’s current account surplus continues to decline 
in relation to GDP Widening global imbalances are not necessarily 
undesirable, to the extent that they reflect increased financial integration 
and a more efficient allocation of global savings across countries.1 But a 
growing gap between the external positions of deficit and surplus 
countries has raised concern about the sustainability of such imbalances 
and the risks that disruptive movements in exchange rates and capital 
flows could pose for global growth.2 Past experience shows that current 
account reversals following rising global imbalances can be sizeable, as 
was the case in the mid-1980s, before imbalances began to rise gradually 
through 2008.  
In this paper, we shed further light on the sustainability of global 
imbalances by first testing for the presence of unit roots in the current 
account positions (measured in relation to GDP) of the United States, 
China, Japan, Germany and the oil-exporting countries using a 
methodology that allows for structural breaks in intercepts and trends. We 
find that the external positions of these major countries/regions are 
stationary around structural breaks, which define episodes of current 
account reversals. In other words, global imbalances build up while 
remaining sustainable for a period of time, until a structural break occurs. 
On the basis of an event analysis of past reversals, it appears that 
structural breaks are associated with shifts in the fiscal stance, exchange 
rate parities and potential output growth, a finding that underscores the 
scope for macroeconomic and structural policies to ensure the 
sustainability of external positions while avoiding potentially disruptive 
reversals.  
The findings of the unit root tests and event analysis, which are 
essentially backward-looking, are complemented by a series of 
simulations carried out using the OECD Global Model, reported in OECD 
(2010a) and summarised in this paper. The simulations refer to alternative 
policy scenarios that could be considered to deal with the current crisis, 
                                                 
1
 It has been argued that increased capital mobility across countries and deeper financial markets in 
individual countries may be consistent with widening current account imbalances (Gourinchas and 
Rey, 2005; Mendoza et al., 2007). 
2
 Of course, tensions over global imbalances are not new. In the early 1970s, mounting current 
account mismatches led to the demise of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. In the 
1980s, imbalances widened again and prompted international efforts to coordinate exchange rate 
movements under the G5/G7 Plaza (1985) and Louvre (1987) arrangements. External current 
account positions began to diverge yet again in the early 1990s and the ensuing reversals in capital 
flows contributed to the emerging market crises of the second half of the decade. 
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which is itself clearly a major structural break. The simulations suggest 
that fiscal consolidation and the associated exchange rate adjustments 
would contribute to a reduction in global imbalances over the longer term, 
but the largest gains would come from a mix of structural reform that 
could reduce consumption in deficit countries and savings in surplus 
countries. A number of structural reforms, discussed briefly in the paper, 
are meritorious in their own right and would have the side-effect of 
addressing global imbalances.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews trends in global 
imbalances and current account developments in the major 
countries/regions. Section 3 reports the main findings of an event analysis 
of the behaviour of fiscal policy, exchange rates and potential output 
growth around current account reversals on the basis of a procedure to 
identify structural breaks in the current account balances of the world’s 
major countries/regions. Section 4 reports the results of simulations of 
different policy scenarios on global imbalances and summarises the 
structural reform actions taken in OECD countries that would also have a 
bearing on their external positions. Section 5 draws some implications for 
long-term capital flows in the post-crisis scenarios. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Trends in Global Imbalances 
2.1 Longer-Term Trends  
Global imbalances, measured as the sum in absolute terms of the 
current account positions of the world’s major countries/regions, have 
exhibited sharp swings over the last 40 years but rarely reached the pre-
crisis level of over 5% of world GDP in 2008 (Figure 1).3 Imbalances rose 
sharply in the first half of the 1980s, following the second oil shock, and 
peaked at the middle of the decade, between the Plaza and Louvre 
agreements on exchange rate management. Imbalances began to rise again 
gradually in the second half of the 1990s, an upward trend that came to an 
end with the global crisis in 2008. The United States has accounted for the 
lion’s share of the world’s current account deficits since the early 1980s. 
But the mix of surplus countries has changed, with the emergence of 
Germany, China and the oil-exporting countries as the main surplus 
countries/regions. 
 
                                                 
3
 External imbalances are also sizeable within the euro area, where large current account surpluses 
(in relation to GDP) in Germany and Netherlands are matched by large deficits in Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain. See OECD (2009a and 2010a) for more information. 
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Figure 1 - Global imbalances, 1970-2010 - Current account balances,* in % of world 
GDP 
 
(*)Data for 2010-11 are projections from the OECD Economic Outlook 87 database. 
Source: OECD (Economic Outlook 87) and national sources. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Net Investment Positions, 1970-2007 In % of Individual Country GDP 
 
Source: Updated and extended version of the External Wealth of Nations Mark II database 
developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
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Consistent with these trends in current account positions, there has 
been a sustained increase in the net foreign asset positions of the surplus 
countries. The United States was a net creditor until 1990 but has since 
then accumulated a net investment deficit of close to 20% of GDP (Figure 
2). By contrast, as a result of persistent surpluses, Japan has accumulated a 
net investment position of close to 50% of GDP, and China has sustained a 
positive net investment position since 2000. Germany depleted its 
accumulated assets in the 1990s following unification as a result of 
persistent current account deficits, a situation that has since then been 
reversed. 
2.2 The Effects of the Crisis  
Global imbalances nearly halved during 2009-10 as a result of the crisis, 
with a marked decline in the United States’ deficit and in the surplus of 
the oil-exporting countries. These developments reflect important 
variations across countries in the magnitude of current account 
adjustments (Figure 3) and the composition of these adjustments between 
private and government balances (Figure 4). In the major surplus 
countries, such as Germany and Japan, a deterioration of government 
balances was not matched by a one-to-one improvement in private 
balances, which led to a fall in these countries’ current account surpluses. 
In the United States, a slight improvement in the current account balance 
took place on the back of an improvement in the private balance, which 
more than compensated for a reduction in the government balance. With 
regard to other countries, changes in the private balance were particularly 
pronounced in Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Spain and New Zealand, 
reflecting substantial deleveraging in the household and corporate sectors 
during the crisis. 
Current account changes during the recession have also reflected 
sizeable variations across countries in the responses of savings and 
investment to the crisis. In the major surplus countries, such as Germany 
and Japan, a fall in national savings accounted for most of the decline in 
these countries’ current account surpluses during 2007-10 (Figure 5). As 
for the United States, a fall in investment accounted for the lion’s share of 
the improvement in the current account balance over the same period. As 
for the other countries, reductions in national savings have been 
particularly large in Ireland, which, coupled with a sharp contraction in 
investment, contributed to a sizeable reduction in the current account 
deficit. 
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Figure 3 - Net Current Account Positions, 2007 and 2010, % of Individual Country GDP 
 
Source: OECD (Economic Outlook 87). 
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Figure 4 - Decomposition of Changes in Current Account Positions: Private and 
Government Balances,* 2007-10, in % of Individual Country GDP 
 
(*) The government balance is defined as the headline budget balance and the private balance is 
calculated as the difference between the current account balance and the headline budget 
balance. 
Source: OECD (Economic Outlook 87). 
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Figure 5 - Decomposition of Changes in Current Account Positions: Saving and 
Investment,* 2007-10, in % of Individual Country GDP 
  
 
 
(*)Investment is measured as gross fixed capital formation and national saving is calculated as 
the sum of the current account balance and investment. 
Source: OECD (Economic Outlook 87). 
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Global imbalances are widening again as the global recovery takes 
hold. The United States’ deficit is rising, in part due to the strength of the 
recovery in that country, with GDP growth outpacing that of the euro-area 
as a whole. The German surplus is also projected to increase, reflecting the 
relative exposure of domestic exporters to the gradual upturn in demand 
for capital goods and the slow recovery of domestic demand. The surplus 
of the oil-exporting countries is also likely to rise, at least for some time, on 
the back of the recent upturn in commodity prices. By contrast, China’s 
current account surplus is projected to fall further in 2010, with buoyant 
domestic demand being accompanied by strong import growth, before 
rising moderately in 2011 as domestic demand growth eases (OECD, 
2010a). 
3 Current Account Reversals: a Few Stylised Facts 
3.1 The Methodology 
There are different methods for assessing the sustainability of current 
account positions. In the absence of capital transfers or measurement 
errors and omissions, a country’s current account balance can be defined 
as: 
 
 
ttttt TBNFArCANFANFA   11  (1)  
 
where NFA, CA and TB denote, respectively, net foreign assets, the 
current account balance and the trade (goods and services) balance in per 
cent of GDP; r is the rate of return on net foreign assets and; and t is a time 
index.  
Equation (1) can be solved forward subject to a no-Ponzi-game 
transversality condition ( 0)1(lim 1  

 Tt
T
T NFAr ), such that 


 

  0
)1(
1 )1(j jt
j
t TBrNFA . It then follows that the sustainability of 
current account positions can be assessed by testing for stationarity of CA 
(in levels) and NFA (in first differences) (Trehan and Walsh, 1991). The 
implication of non-stationarity is that the CA and NFA series are not 
mean-reverting, and fluctuations in these series would only converge back 
to equilibrium in response to exogenous shocks.  
3.2 Testing for Stationarity4 
The Lee and Strazicich (1999, 2003) procedure is used to test for the 
presence of unit roots in CA (in levels) and NFA (in first differences). The 
                                                 
4
 This section draws on de Mello et al. (2010). 
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two-break Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit root test statistic can be 
estimated as follows: 
 
 
tttt uSZy  1
~
  (2)  
 
where 
~~~
txtt ZyS  , Tt ,...,2 , 
~
 are coefficients in the regression of 
ty  on tZ  for a data generating process defined as ttt eZy    and 
ttt ee   1  where tZ  is a vector of exogenous variables and t  is 
distributed ),0( 2N , and x
~  is given by 
~
11 Zy  , where 1y  and 1Z  are the 
first observations of ty  and tZ , respectively. The unit root null hypothesis 
is described by 0 , and the LM test statistics are given by 
~
T  and 
~  t-statistic testing for the null hypothesis 0 .   
The breaks are determined endogenously through a grid search to be 
where the test statistic is minimised. Critical values and the asymptotic 
distributions of the tests are reported in Lee and Strazicich (1999, 2003). 
This minimum LM test has the advantage of allowing for structural 
breaks in intercepts and trends in both the null (unit roots with breaks) 
and alternative (stationarity around breaks) hypotheses and therefore 
improves upon previous tests that also determine structural breaks 
endogenously but define the breaks only under the alternative hypothesis, 
such as that of Zivot and Andrews (1992), which may suffer from spurious 
rejection problems. Rejection of the Lee-Strazicich null unambiguously 
implies a trend stationary process. Another advantage of the Lee-
Strazicich test is that, by identifying structural breaks endogenously, it 
allows for setting a chronology of current account reversals that are 
consistent with stationarity in the CA ad NFA series. Instead, the 
empirical literature typically uses ex-ante definitions of current account 
reversals based on the size of adjustments in external positions (Milesi-
Ferretti and Razin, 2000; Eichengreen and Adalet, 2005), rather than 
endogenously determined structural breaks in the relevant series. 
We started by allowing for the presence of two breaks in intercepts and 
trends. If one of the breaks identified on the basis of the two break tests 
was not found to be significant (in both intercepts and trends), we used 
instead an alternative version of the test that allows for the presence of a 
single break. Data on CA are available from the OECD Economic Outlook 
database and the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics. Data on NFA is obtained from the updated and extended 
version of the External Wealth of Nations Mark II database developed by 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
The results, reported in Table 1, show that, first, the hypothesis of a unit 
root with breaks can be rejected against the alternative of stationarity 
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around breaks at the 5% level for all countries/regions.5 The findings are 
by and large robust to the use of annual data for CA and NFA, as well as 
annual data at the quarterly frequency for CA to deal with seasonal effects 
in current account determination. Second, there is some variation in the 
chronology of breaks across countries and data frequencies. On the basis 
of the annual data, for which data are available for both CA and NFA, 
there have been structural breaks in the CA series in 1982-83 (United 
States, Japan and the oil-exporting countries), 1990-92 (China, United 
States and the oil-exporting countries), 1996 (China, Germany and Japan) 
and 2001 (China). As for NFA, there appears to have been structural 
breaks in 1982 (United States), 1990-92 (China, Germany and the oil-
exporting countries), 1998-99 (United States, Japan) and 2003 (Japan and 
Germany). The corresponding chronology based on the quarterly data is 
by and large consistent with that computed for the annual data, with the 
exception of the break in 1996 for Japan, which is not identified when the 
higher-frequency data are used. 
The empirical analysis reported above shows that the external positions 
of the world’s major surplus and deficit countries/regions are sustainable 
around structural breaks (Figure 6). Rejection of the hypothesis of unit 
roots with breaks in favour of the alternative of stationary around breaks 
suggests that current account balances are sustainable between breaks but 
not indefinitely. Sooner or later current account reversals occur to ensure 
the sustainability of external positions. Failure to account for structural 
breaks would lead to an erroneous acceptance of the hypothesis of unit 
roots, which would imply that current account balances are not 
sustainable. Understanding the characteristics of such breaks and the 
behaviour of macroeconomic and structural policies around such breaks 
would therefore shed light of how policy action can help to ensure the 
sustainability of external positions.6 
                                                 
5
 The possibility of non-linear dynamics in current account adjustment has also been entertained. 
For example, Christopoulos and Léon-Ledesma (2010) carried out smooth-transition unit root tests 
for the United States current account balance and could not reject the null of non-stationarity. 
6
 There is a large empirical literature on the determinants of current account balances in individual 
countries, based on the workhorse inter-temporal models pioneered by Razin (1995) and Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (1998). Cross-country evidence is also available (Chinn and Prasad, 2003; Chinn and 
Ito, 2008). However, empirical analysis of the determinants of current account reversals is more 
limited and focused predominantly on non-OECD countries (Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 2000; 
Eichengreen and Adalet, 2005). The literature shows that current account reversals are prompted 
by changes in the domestic policy stance, essentially fiscal policy, and external shocks, such as 
sudden stops in financial flows and terms-of-trade shocks. 
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Table 1 - Current Account Sustainability: Unit Root Tests 
 Series1 Period Two breaks One break 
   Lag Test Breaks2 Lag Test Break2 
          
United States CA, annual 1971-2007 2 -5.77** 1982ns 1990sn    
 D(NFA), annual 1971-2007 0 -5.81** 1982ss 1999ss    
 CA, quarterly 1971-2007 7 -4.80 1984q4ss 1990q4ss    
 CA quarterly, 4-quarter 
flows 
1971-2007 6 -5.57* 1983q4ns 1991q3ns    
          
Japan CA, annual 1971-2007 1 -6.59*** 1982ns 1996ss    
 D(NFA), annual 1971-2007 2 -7.66*** 1998ss 2003ss    
 CA, quarterly 1971-2007 6 -5.90** 1982q4ns 1988q3ss    
 CA quarterly, 4-quarter 
flows 
1971-2007 1 -6.25** 1979q2ss 1987q3ns    
          
China CA, annual 1992-2007 2 -6.99*** 1996ss 2001ns    
 D(NFA), annual 1982-2007 0 -5.87** 1986nn 1990ss 0 -5.10*** 1990ns 
 CA, quarterly 1992-2007 2 -5.97** 1996q3ns 2004q1ns    
 CA quarterly, 4-quarter 
flows 
92q4-2007 1 -7.94*** 1997q1ns 2003q1ns    
          
Germany CA, annual 1991-2007 2 -12.26*** 1998ns 2002ss    
 CA, quarterly 1991-2007 4 -6.46*** 1999q4ss 2004q2ss    
 CA quarterly, 4-quarter 
flows 
91q4-2007 3 -6.37*** 2000q1ns 2004q4nn 8 -7.22*** 2005q4ss 
          
Oil-exporters3 CA, annual 1971-2007 2 -6.69*** 1983ss 1992ns    
Oil-exporters 4 D(NFA), annual 1971-2007 2 -6.77*** 1976ss 1992ss    
Oil-exporters 5 CA, quarterly 1971-2007 8 -8.83*** 1983q2ns 1991q1nn 8 -6.71*** 2004q1ss 
Oil-exporters 5 CA quarterly, 4-quarter 
flows 
71q4-2007 5 -9.00*** 1983q3ns 1994q1ns    
Notes: Critical values for the two- and one-break tests are available from Lee and Strazicich (1999 
and 2003). The optimal number of lagged first-differenced terms included in the unit root test to 
correct for serial correlation is selected according to the general-to-specific procedure of Lee and 
Strazicich (1999 and 2003) with a maximum number of lags set to 2 and 8 for the annual and 
quarterly data, respectively. Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels is indicated by ***, 
** and *, respectively.  
1. CA = current account balance (in levels and in per cent of GDP), D(NFA) = net foreign assets (in 
first differences and in per cent of GDP), 4-quarter flows = flows accumulated over four quarters.  
2. The significance of breaks in intercepts and trends is identified by “n” (non-significant) and “s” 
(significant) at the 10% level. 
3. Includes Canada, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.  
4. Includes Saudi Arabia, Iran, Canada, Norway, Nigeria, Venezuela and Mexico. 
5. Includes Canada and Saudi Arabia. 
Source: OECD (Economic Outlook 86), IMF (International Financial Statistics), Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007), national sources; and authors’ estimations. 
 
The event analysis depicted in Figure 7 for the chronology of structural 
breaks identified in Annex 1 shows that the behaviour of fiscal policy 
differs in deficit and surplus countries prior to and after current account 
reversals. In the United States, the world’s largest deficit country, the 
budget balance deteriorates prior to current account reversals and 
improves thereafter (a pattern also observed in Japan in the late 1970s 
break). This suggests that fiscal consolidation may contribute to reducing 
global imbalances, although the responses of private saving to changes in 
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government savings also need to be taken into account (as discussed 
below). In the surplus countries (Germany, Japan in the late 1980s break, 
and China, albeit for a short period of time), by contrast, budget balances 
tend to continue to improve after current account reversals, suggesting 
that concern about the sustainability of public finances is not a major 
driver of current account adjustment in these countries. 
 
Figure 6 - Current Account Balances and Structural Breaks, 1970-2007. Based on the 
structural breaks identified in Table A1.1, in % of individual country GDP. 
 
(1) Includes Canada and Saudi Arabia.  
Source: (Economic Outlook 87), national sources; and authors’ estimations. 
 
Inspection of exchange rate patterns in the vicinity of current account 
reversals is also instructive. In the United States, structural breaks in that 
country’s current account balance are associated with a continued trade-
adjusted nominal appreciation of the US dollar, albeit by a smaller 
magnitude in the early 1990s episode than in the early 1980s break. In the 
surplus countries, there is some heterogeneity in exchange rate behaviour 
around current account reversals, which tend to be followed by a 
depreciation of the trade-adjusted exchange rate, albeit with some lag in 
the case of the late 1980s episode in Japan. There nevertheless appears to 
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be little change in the exchange rate after reversals in the case of the oil-
exporting countries and Germany. As for China, exchange rate patterns 
changed radically between the two episodes of current account reversals 
depicted in the event analysis.  
 
Figure 7 - An Event Analysis of Current Account Reversals1 
First break Second break 
A. Government balance
2
 (rescaled to 0 at t0) 
 
B. Nominal effective exchange rate (rescaled to 100 at t0) 
 
C. Potential output growth (annualised quarterly rates, rescaled to 0 at t0) 
 
First break: t0 = 1983q4 for the United States, 1979q2 for Japan, 1997q1 for China, and 1983q3 
for the oil-exporting countries 
Second break: t0 = 1991q3 for the United States, 1987q3 for Japan, 2003q1 for China, 2005q4 for 
Germany and 1994q1 for the oil-exporting countries 
(1) Based on the structural breaks identified in Table A1.1using annual data for the current 
account-to-GDP ratio at the quarterly frequency.   
(2) Data are not available for the oil-exporting countries. 
(3) Includes Canada and Saudi Arabia. 
Source: OECD (Economic Outlook 87), national sources; and authors’ calculations. 
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The longer-term repercussions of current account reversals can be 
gauged by looking at patterns in potential output growth around 
structural breaks. Potential output appears to accelerate in the aftermath 
of corrections in external positions in deficit and surplus countries alike, a 
development that is nevertheless short-lived, as the post-reversal growth 
impetus appears to ebb after a year. This suggests that structural reform is 
needed to entrench the short-term impact of regained external 
sustainability on potential growth.  
4 Resolving Global Imbalances in a Durable Manner 
4.1 Policy Simulations 
The stylized facts highlighted by the event analysis of current account 
reversals need to be assessed in greater detail. Recent analysis carried out 
by the OECD (OECD, 2010a), based on the Organisation’s Global Model,7 
illustrates the effect of different policy scenarios for fiscal consolidation 
and the implementation of structural reform on global imbalances. The 
premises underpinning the different policy scenarios are described in 
Annex 1. The results of the simulations are reported in Table 2. 
4.2 Business-as-usual Scenario 
In a baseline scenario characterised by the closure of output gaps from 
their current levels and relatively unambitious fiscal policy in OECD 
countries focused on stabilising government indebtedness in relation to 
GDP, global imbalances would re-emerge over the medium term, while 
remaining below the levels prevailing immediately before the crisis. The 
current account deficit of the United States would rise to just over 4% of 
GDP over the medium-to-longer term (2015-25), while the Chinese surplus 
would widen gradually to about 5.5 per cent of GDP in 2025. The current 
account surplus of Japan would fall gradually to about 2% of GDP in 2025 
as a result of population ageing. The current-account balance of the euro 
area would rise to about 1.3% of GDP at the end of the simulation period, 
although much larger imbalances would remain within the area. 
 
                                                 
7
 The OECD Global Model combines short-term Keynesian dynamics with consistent long-run 
neo-classical supply-side responses. It also features stock-flow consistency, with explicit 
modelling of domestic and international assets, liabilities and associated income streams and so 
gives prominence to wealth and the role of asset prices in the transmission of international shocks. 
The Model identifies the United States, the euro area and Japan with the remainder of the OECD 
divided in two regions. As for the non-OECD area, China is identified as a single block and the 
remainder of the non-OECD area is divided in three geographical regions. For further details see 
Hervé et al. (2010). 
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Table 2 - Heritage Impact of Fiscal Consolidation, Exchange Rate Flexibility and 
Structural Reform on External Positions,1 in Per Cent of GDP 
  Current account balance 
Difference from baseline 
scenario 
  2008 2011 2015 2025 2011 2015 2025 
United States 
    
  
  Baseline -4.9 -4.0 -4.1 -4.2 ... ... ... 
Plus fiscal consolidation -4.9 -3.7 -4.0 -4.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 
Plus exchange rate response -4.9 -3.6 -3.6 -3.5 0.4 0.5 0.7 
Plus structural reform -4.9 -3.5 -2.8 -1.0 0.5 1.3 3.2 
Japan 
    
  
  Baseline 3.3 3.5 3.1 2.0 ... ... ... 
Plus fiscal consolidation 3.3 3.8 4.3 2.7 0.3 1.2 0.7 
Plus exchange rate response 3.3 4.0 4.6 3.5 0.5 1.5 1.5 
Plus structural reform 3.3 3.9 4.8 2.9 0.4 1.7 0.9 
Euro area 
    
  
  Baseline -0.8 0.8 1.1 1.3 ... ... ... 
Plus fiscal consolidation -0.8 1.1 0.4 1.4 0.3 -0.7 0.1 
Plus exchange rate response -0.8 1.1 0.7 1.7 0.3 -0.4 0.4 
Plus structural reform -0.8 1.2 0.7 1.8 0.4 -0.4 0.5 
China 
    
  
  Baseline 9.4 3.4 4.0 5.5 ... ... ... 
Plus fiscal consolidation 9.4 3.2 3.9 5.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 
Plus exchange rate response 9.4 2.8 3.3 4.7 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 
Plus structural reform 9.4 2.3 2.2 3.1 -1.1 -1.8 -2.4 
Other non-OECD Asia 
    
  
  Baseline 2.7 1.9 1.7 1.5 ... ... ... 
Plus fiscal consolidation 2.7 1.3 1.6 1.2 -0.6 -0.1 -0.3 
Plus exchange rate response 2.7 1.5 1.3 0.7 -0.4 -0.4 -0.8 
Plus structural reform 2.7 1.5 0.7 -0.7 -0.4 -1.0 -2.2 
(1) The underlying assumptions are described in Annex 2. 
Source: OECD (2010a). 
 
4.3 Fiscal Consolidation and Associated Exchange-rate 
Adjustments 
The effect of fiscal consolidation on global imbalances depends to a 
large extent on how private saving responds to changes in government 
saving. Empirical analysis for OECD countries suggests that, contrary to 
the predictions based on Ricardian Equivalence, only about one-half of 
increases in government saving are offset by a reduction in private saving 
in the short term, against about two-thirds in the long term (de Mello et al. 
2004). Of course, the impact on global imbalances of fiscal consolidation in 
individual countries abstracts from spillover effects associated with 
simultaneous consolidation in a large number of countries.  
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To be sure, an alternative scenario simulated using the OECD Global 
Model takes into account sufficient fiscal consolidation starting in 2011 to 
reduce government debt-to-GDP ratios in 2025 to their pre-crisis levels 
(except for Japan) and some consequent depreciation of OECD currencies 
vis-à-vis their non-OECD counterparts. The simulations results, also 
reported in Table 1, suggest that fiscal consolidation has only limited 
impact on external imbalances, in part because all OECD economies 
engage in consolidation simultaneously. 
In addition, fiscal consolidation would affect OECD currencies, which 
would likely depreciate relative to the currencies of non-OECD countries. 
This adjustment in exchange rates would reduce the current account 
surpluses of China and other non-OECD Asian countries by about ½ 
percentage point of GDP and reduce the US deficit by a similar amount 
relative to fiscal consolidation scenario. 
4.4 Structural reform 
It is difficult to be sure about the magnitude and direction of the impact 
of structural reforms on a country’s external current account position. 
Reforms to product and labour market regulations, as well as to tax 
systems, affect savings and investment behaviour through demand- and 
supply-side channels that often interrelated and mutually reinforcing. The 
net effect of reforms therefore depends on the instruments used and the 
framework conditions prevailing in individual countries. Possible reform 
packages are discussed in Annex 2. 
A simulation of the impact on external positions of a set of stylised 
structural reforms that would reduce (raise) savings in surplus (deficit) 
countries, especially China and dynamic non-OECD countries in Asia, and 
reduce structural unemployment in the euro area, underscores the 
importance of such reforms in reducing global imbalances in a sustained 
manner. In particular, in the structural reform scenario, the external deficit 
of the United States would be reduced by over 2.5% of GDP and the 
Chinese surplus would fall by more than 1.5% of GDP relative to the 
scenario with fiscal consolidation and attendant exchange- rate 
adjustments. The surplus of other dynamic Asian economies would 
contract by about 1.5 percentage point of GDP. 
5 Implications for Capital Flows in the Post-crisis 
Scenarios 
The global crisis and the ensuing recovery are too recent to be picked 
up as a structural break by the unit root tests. But, given the magnitude of 
the current account reversal that took place in 2008-10, it is likely that a 
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structural break will be identified around 2009-10 as new data become 
available. Lessons from previous current account reversals drawn from 
the event analysis, coupled with the policy simulations reported above, 
provide insights into the types of macroeconomic and structural policies 
that could bring about a sustained reduction in global imbalances. While 
such imbalances can be reduced through appropriate policies, they will 
not be (and indeed should not be) completely eliminated. A new 
configuration of external positions among the world’s main economic 
areas would therefore have implications for the flows of capital between 
surplus and deficit countries. It is difficult to ascertain the changes in the 
magnitude and direction of capital flows that would follow from the 
implementation of specific structural reforms in the years to come, but a 
few stylised facts can be highlighted. For example: 
• Fiscal consolidation tends to follow current account reversals on the 
basis of previous experience and will be much needed in some 
countries as a result of a massive build-up of government debt related 
to the global crisis. A reduction over the years in the supply of 
government bonds in (mostly advanced) countries that currently have 
high debt and/or budget deficits could therefore lead to a rebalancing 
of capital flows from surplus to deficit countries towards corporate 
bonds, equity and/or foreign direct investment, which could be 
growth-enhancing. Of course, for such a rebalancing to take place, the 
effects of changes in the rates of return of riskless assets (government 
bonds) and private sector securities on demand for those assets would 
need to be taken into account.  
• Greater exchange-rate flexibility in those emerging-market economies 
that currently have large current account surpluses could also lead to a 
change in international capital flows. In the event of a revaluation of 
their exchange-rate parities, surplus countries whose currencies are 
currently pegged or tightly linked to the U.S. dollar, such as China and 
the oil-exporting countries, would no longer need to accumulate large 
amounts of international reserves in the form of U.S. government 
bonds. To the extent that lower demand for U.S. bonds is matched at 
least in part by rising investment in corporate bonds, equity and FDI in 
deficit countries, a combination of fiscal consolidation in deficit 
countries with greater exchange-rate flexibility in surplus countries 
could be growth-enhancing. 
• Structural reform to lift global potential output after the crisis could 
have potentially strong effects on the composition of capital flows, 
especially if combined with fiscal consolidation in deficit countries and 
greater exchange rate flexibility in emerging market economies with 
large current account surpluses. For example, initiatives that could lead 
to higher household savings in the United States (for example, through 
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the elimination of tax deductibility of mortgage payments and greater 
reliance on consumption taxes) would affect the size and composition 
of insurance and pension fund portfolios. A liberalisation of entry 
restrictions in sheltered sectors in surplus countries, such as Germany 
and Japan, could create opportunities for foreign investment in those 
countries. On the other hand, reforms in emerging-market economies 
with large current account surpluses aimed at reducing household 
savings by strengthening social safety nets and/or corporate savings 
through financial market reform would increase the attractiveness of 
investing in such countries, thus limiting capital outflows towards 
advanced economies. 
6 Conclusions 
Global imbalances have shrunk considerably in the aftermath of the 
global crisis and the recession that followed it but are likely to re-emerge 
during the recovery. Large swings in capital flows are often needed to 
restore the sustainability of external positions in surplus and deficit 
countries alike. An event analysis based on a chronology of current 
account reversals needed to ensure that the ratios of current account 
balances to GDP in the world’s main economic areas are stationary 
highlights a few stylised facts about the behaviour of macroeconomic and 
structural policies around structural breaks. The global financial and 
economic crisis could clearly be associated with a structural break in 
external positions, but the crisis is too recent to be picked up by the unit 
root test. Nevertheless, policy simulations based on the OECD Global 
Model allow for a comparison of the evolution of current account 
imbalances in the medium-to-longer term according to different scenarios 
for fiscal consolidation, exchange rate movements and structural reform. 
The simulations highlight the scope for raising long-term potential output 
and reducing global imbalances through a combination of fiscal 
consolidation to bring government indebtedness back to pre-crisis levels 
over time and structural reforms to reduce consumption in deficit 
countries and savings in surplus countries.  
The different policy scenarios have implications for the direction and 
composition of long-term capital flows that will be needed to finance 
global imbalances in the years to come. While a detailed analysis of such 
implications requires further investigation, a few stylized facts can be 
emphasised. First, following fiscal consolidation in many advanced 
economies, capital flows from surplus to deficit countries could also imply 
a move away from government securities towards corporate bonds, equity 
and/or foreign direct investment, which could be growth-enhancing. 
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Second, with greater exchange-rate flexibility emerging-market economies 
with large current account surpluses would accumulate smaller amounts 
of international reserves in the form of U.S. government bonds, and 
therefore redirect their capital outflows to different investment modalities. 
Third, structural reforms, such as a liberalisation of entry restrictions in 
sheltered sectors in advanced surplus countries, could create 
opportunities for foreign investment in those countries. By the same token, 
reforms in surplus emerging-market economies aimed at reducing 
household savings through a strengthening of safety nets and/or 
corporate savings through financial market reform would unleash 
opportunities for investment in those countries, thus limiting capital 
outflows towards advanced economies.  
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Annex 1. Global Imbalances: Simulation of Policy 
Scenarios1  
Baseline Scenario 
The following assumptions are made in the baseline scenario for the 
period 2012-25: 
• GDP and unemployment. GDP grows at its potential rate after 2025, 
when the output gap is closed in all OECD countries. Adjustments to 
potential output (capital, structural unemployment, labour force 
participation) resulting from the crisis are completed by 2015. For the 
2015-25 period, OECD countries experience a slow convergence to annual 
labour productivity growth of 1¾ per cent per year. Structural 
unemployment rates return to their pre-crisis levels by 2015, once post-
crisis hysteresis has subsided, in those countries with more flexible labour 
markets and by 2025 in all other countries.  
• Prices and exchange rates. Oil and other commodity prices rise by 1% 
per year in real terms after 2011. Exchange rates remain unchanged in 
nominal terms in OECD countries; for other countries an estimated 
Balassa-Samuelson effect is used as a basis for assumed currency 
appreciation between 2011 and 2025. The renminbi appreciates gradually 
by about 20% in real terms against all currencies through 2025, with about 
half of this appreciation being associated with the convergence in GDP per 
capita over the period. 
• Fiscal policy. The underlying primary budget deficit is reduced by 0.5% 
of GDP per year for as long as it takes to stabilise the ratio of government 
debt to GDP over the medium term. In most cases, this pace of fiscal 
consolidation leads to a further build-up of government debt before it 
stabilises. There are no further losses to government balance sheets as a 
result of asset purchases or guarantees made in dealing with the financial 
crisis. Effects on public budgets from population ageing and continued 
upward pressures on health spending are not included. Government debt 
is projected to increase by about 30 percentage points of GDP by 2011 
relative to pre-crisis levels and by about a further 20 percentage points of 
GDP before it stabilises. 
• Monetary policy. Interest rates are normalised towards 2015 in order to 
bring inflation in line with medium-term objectives. For Japan it is 
assumed that once the output gap has closed and inflation returns to 1% in 
2015, the target rate of inflation for monetary policy will be fixed at 2%. 
                                                 
1
 This Annex draws on OECD (2010a). 
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• Long-term interest rates. Long-term interest rates increase by 4 basis 
points (1 basis point for Japan) for every additional percentage point 
increase in the government debt-to-GDP ratio above 75% of GDP. The 
projected 30 percentage-point increase in the government debt-to-GDP 
ratio by 2011 relative to pre-crisis would add about 125 basis points to 
OECD long-term interest rates. 
• Non-OECD countries. After 2011, emerging-market economies show a 
slow convergence to US growth rates in per capita income (measured at 
purchasing power parity). Trade growth in emerging-market economies is 
determined by a non-OECD trade equations (Pain et al., 2005) with 
country-specific coefficients taken from regional estimates that reflect 
structural sources of current account balances (Cheung et al., 2010). 
Fiscal Consolidation  
This scenario involves sufficient fiscal consolidation staring in 2011 to 
reduce government debt-to-GDP ratios in 2025 to the pre-crisis levels 
prevailing in each region (except for Japan). Due to Japan’s high level of 
indebtedness, only half of the increase in debt in the aftermath of the crisis 
is reversed by 2025. In addition: 
•  GDP growth is lower in 2011-12 in all OECD countries due to fiscal 
consolidation, depending on the extent of the required adjustment, and 
higher relative to the baseline scenario from 2013 due to the lower interest 
rates associated with the fall in government indebtedness.  
• OECD currencies fall by 10% relative to their non-OECD counterparts 
immediately and by a further 10% over the following ten years in response 
to the announcement of consolidation. 
Structural Reform Scenario 
The scenario combines sufficient fiscal consolidation staring in 2011 to 
reduce government debt-to-GDP ratios in 2025 to the pre-crisis levels 
prevailing in each region (except for Japan) and the attendant effects on 
exchange rate parities between OECD and non-OECD countries, as well as 
a set of stylised structural reforms, including: an improvement of financial 
market regulation, the elimination of distortionary tax incentives and the 
pricing of environmental externalities of fossil fuel use in the United 
States; pro-competition product and labour market reforms that would 
boost potential growth and reduce structural unemployment in the euro 
area; an easing of product market regulations and reforms to deepen 
financial markets in Japan; and a combination of policy reforms to 
improve social safety nets and expand the provision of health care, 
facilitate access of households to credit and strengthen the business and 
financial environments in China and other non-OECD Asian economies. 
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The following assumptions are made to take these structural reforms into 
account in the simulations over the period 2012-25: 
• Savings. Private and public saving is lowered by 3% of GDP in China 
and other non-OECD Asian economies. Private demand is raised by 2% of 
GDP in Japan. Private saving is raised by 1% of GDP in the United States. 
These changes are phased in over eight years beginning from 2011.  
• Unemployment. The structural unemployment rate is reduced in the 
euro area by 2 percentage points over the next eight years to bring it more 
into line with the average across other OECD countries. 
• Exchange rates. Exchange rates adjust to changes in domestic saving. In 
particular, the renminbi appreciates by 20% and the US dollar depreciates 
by 10% over two years. These adjustments allow for the impact on GDP of 
lower (higher) private savings in China (United States) to be compensated 
by lower (higher) net exports. 
de Mello, Padoan: Are Global Imbalances Sustainable? Post Crisis Scenarios 
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/23 28 
 
Annex 2. Possible Structural Reform Packages 
The structural reform scenario discussed in the text is stylised in that it 
takes the outcomes of structural reforms on savings and unemployment in 
surplus and deficit countries and factors in the attendant exchange rate 
effects.  
 
Table A2.1 - Implementation of Going for Growth priorities in OECD countries, 2005-09 
 Action taken
1
 
 Surplus countries
2
 Deficit countries
2
 
Product market regulations   
Reduce entry barriers in services 
and/or industries in general 
Austria, Japan, Korea France, Italy, Poland 
Reduce entry barriers in network 
industries 
Germany, Netherlands*, 
Switzerland 
Australia, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Portugal 
Reduce entry barriers in professional 
services 
Austria, Canada, Germany, 
Switzerland* 
 
Reduce entry barriers in retail 
distribution 
Belgium, Denmark,  France, Ireland* 
Reduce administrative burdens Austria*, Belgium*, Denmark, 
Netherlands* 
Czech Republic, Greece*, 
Hungary*, Turkey* 
Reform corporate governance  Italy* 
Reduce the scope for public ownership Sweden*  Turkey* 
Labour market regulations   
Reform disability and sickness benefits Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland* 
Australia, Hungary, Poland*, 
United Kingdom 
Review wage formation or minimum 
cost of labour 
 Turkey 
Reform employment protection 
legislation 
Sweden France, Greece, New Zealand, 
Portugal 
Taxation   
Simplification, reduction of distortions 
and base broadening 
Canada, Japan Mexico, United States 
Lower labour taxes Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Sweden 
Australia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Italy, Poland, Turkey 
Reduce implicit tax on continuing to 
work and work at older age 
Belgium, Denmark*, Finland, 
Germany*, Norway*  
France, Greece, Spain, Turkey 
Reduce implicit tax on returning to 
work following childbirth 
Austria, Germany, Korea, 
Netherlands, Switzerland 
Ireland, New Zealand, United 
Kingdom 
Financial regulation   
Privatisation, non-performing loans, 
regulation and supervision 
Japan, Korea United States 
(1) Refers to the assessment of progress made in implementing Going for Growth 
recommendations (OECD, 2010b). The list refers to countries where actions have been taken to 
address the relevant policy priority identified in previous reviews. Countries where actions have 
been taken and resulted in the removal of the policy priority in subsequent reviews are identified 
with an asterisk.  
(2) Based on the average current account balances during 2005-09.  
Source: Going for Growth database. 
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It does not, however, consider the composition of reform packages and 
the effect of different initiatives on savings and unemployment in different 
countries. But review of policy implementation to address the priorities 
identified in the OECD’s regular surveillance of structural reform in the 
Organisation’s member countries and in an increasing number of large 
emerging-market economies outside the OECD membership suggests that 
steps have been taken in areas that would have a bearing on their current 
account positions (Table A2.1).2 In most cases, initiatives have focused on 
product market regulations, financial sector reform (with emphasis on 
regulation) and tax reform (with emphasis on an alleviation of the tax 
burden on labour income).3  
Product Market Regulations 
 Product market deregulation that removes barriers to entry may foster 
foreign investment (Alesina et al., 2005), which may weaken the 
current account balance before balancing mechanisms gradually set in 
(Kennedy and Sløk, 2005). However, to the extent that these reforms 
also affect labour productivity and trade competitiveness, it is possible 
that the current account surplus may rise once the effects of 
deregulation on investment subside. It is therefore particularly 
difficult to ascertain the net effect of product market reforms on the 
external positions of surplus and deficit countries. 
 Surveillance of structural policies in OECD member countries and 
major emerging-market economies outside the OECD area shows that 
action has been taken in several countries to make product market 
regulations more pro-competition. In the case of Germany, for 
example, effort has been made to reduce barriers to professional 
services. Further reform to this effect would be desirable, because the 
non-tradable sector, particularly services, remains shielded from 
productivity-enhancing competition that could unleash opportunities 
for investment and therefore contribute to a reduction in the country’s 
large current account surplus (OECD, 2010b and 2010c).  
 Notwithstanding progress in many areas in recent years, further 
product market reforms remain a priority in deficit and surplus 
countries alike. This includes a strengthening of competition in 
                                                 
2
 The OECD carries out a regular surveillance of structural policies in the Organisation’s member 
countries with emphasis on those policy actions that are associated with better outcomes in terms 
of potential output. The exercise is instructive from the viewpoint of assessing the effect of 
structural reform on global imbalances, because several pro-growth initiatives also have a side-
effect of affecting a country’s current account position through their impact on saving and 
investment behaviour. 
3
 See de Mello and Padoan (2010) for more information and discussion on the basis of empirical 
analysis carried out at the OECD. 
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network industries (Australia, the European Union at large, Mexico) 
and professional services (Canada), an alleviation of regulatory 
barriers to competition (Brazil, France and Germany), and a reduction 
of public ownership (Italy, India, Indonesia) and restrictions on 
foreign investment (Indonesia, Japan, Mexico). 
Financial Market Regulation 
• Empirical evidence for OECD countries shows that financial reform is 
associated with a weakening of the current account balance in the 
short term (Cheung et al., 2010; Kennedy and Sløk, 2005). This is 
essentially because of the scope for financial market reforms to 
unleash opportunity for investment (e.g. Cheung et al., 2010; OECD, 
2003; Pelgrin et al., 2002), which may attract capital inflows. Action 
taken to strengthen financial markets in surplus countries, such as 
Japan and Korea, may therefore contribute to reducing their current 
account surpluses. In Korea, for example, there has been considerable 
progress in the privatisation of banks and investment trust companies 
to extent pro-competition reforms to banking and financial sector at 
large.   
• At the same time, reform to deepen financial markets in emerging-
market surplus countries would allow for excess savings to be 
invested domestically, which would be associated, all else equal, with 
a reduction in these countries’ current account surpluses. Such policies 
would have the side effect of reducing demand for the financial assets 
of deficit countries with deeper, more liquid financial markets and 
would therefore contribute to lowering external imbalances on a 
global scale.4  However, financial liberation has been slow in China, 
despite progress in opening up the financial sector to international 
investors and in allowing domestic investors to invest abroad (Herd et 
al., 2010). 
Employment Protection Legislation 
• Efforts to raise effective labour supply by removing regulatory 
impediments in labour market regulations would affect the current 
account by boosting trade competitiveness (if domestic demand for 
labour is not fully elastic) and the profitability of domestic capital 
(Kennedy and Sløk, 2005). Deficit countries would benefit from 
structural reforms to enhance wage flexibility and reduce the non-
                                                 
4
 It has been argued that, due to a savings glut in East Asia, demand for foreign financial assets by 
these countries has been the main driver of the current-account deficit in the United States 
(Bernanke, 2005; Caballero et al., 2008; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009). 
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wage components of labour compensation, which could help to 
improve competitiveness by damping the growth of unit labour costs.  
• There has been relatively limited progress in reforming employment 
protection legislation in most countries since 2005, although action has 
been taken to reform disability and sickness benefits in Australia and 
United Kingdom. Turkey has taken steps to cut social security 
contributions for low-wage earners. Brazil has also taken action to 
alleviate the tax burden on labour income (OECD, 2009c). A reform of 
minimum wage setting has been recommended for Indonesia (OECD, 
2008) as a means of reducing barriers to the formalisation of labour 
relations, but action has yet to be taken. 
Social Safety Nets 
• Specific social reforms may influence savings decisions and 
subsequently the current account balance. The responsiveness of 
household savings to increases in government-financed social 
spending also tends to be stronger in countries with low levels of 
social spending (Baldacci et al., 2010; Furceri and Mourougane, 2010).5 
Otherwise desirable policy initiatives, such as a strengthening of 
formal social safety nets, which would reduce public savings through 
an increase in social spending, could also have the side-effect of 
reducing household savings in some surplus emerging-market 
economies. Empirical evidence for China suggests that pension and 
health care reforms have a significant impact on household saving.6  
Tax Policy 
• Tax reforms affect the investment and saving decisions of firms and 
households through their impact on after-tax income, the after-tax rate 
of return on saving and the tax deductibility of the expenses for fixed 
assets (depreciation allowances) and of interest expenses on loans. 
Corporate tax cuts and increases in depreciation allowances boost firm 
investment (Vartia, 2008; Schwellnus and Arnold, 2008). Tax reform 
could reduce incentives for over-consumption in deficit countries, 
such as the United States. This could be achieved, for example, by 
                                                 
5
 The results imply, for example, that a 1% increase in social spending would reduce the saving-to-
GDP ratio by about ½ percentage point in the average OECD country, but by as much as 1 
percentage point in China. Barnett and Brooks (2010) show that an increase in health spending by 
one renminbi leads to up to a two renminbi increase in urban household consumption. As a result 
the projected increase by 1¾ percentage points of GDP in social spending in China could reduce 
saving by about 1½-2% of GDP in the medium and long terms. 
6
 Feng et al. (2009) show that the pension reform for enterprise employees in China implemented 
in the late 1990s lowered pension wealth and raised household savings. See also OECD (2010d) 
for more information. 
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scrapping income tax deductibility for mortgage payments or shifting 
the personal income tax further to a consumption base, would have an 
influence on the current account. It should nevertheless be recognised 
that empirical evidence on the effect of tax reform on the current 
account balanced is fairly mixed. Reducing the average tax wedge 
would improve the current account balance through an increase in 
exports and a decrease in imports (Nicoletti et al., 2003), an increase in 
investment (OECD, 2003; Alesina et al., 2002) and a decrease in net 
FDI outflows (Nicoletti et al., 2003). On the other hand, a reduction in 
the overall tax burden would weaken the current account balance 
(Kennedy and Sløk, 2005). 
Other Policy Areas 
• Other structural reforms may have an effect on the current account. 
Initiatives to reduce oil consumption could lower the current account 
deficit in oil-importing countries, although the final impact depends 
on how such policies affect the fiscal deficit and consumption of other 
goods. 
